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Summary findings
The main constraint on World Bank operations in tax  Projects have made inadequate use of different kinds of
and customs administration is the Bank's inadequate  perforinance indicators, with little uniformity in those
institutional framework for accumulating knowledge  applied.
from loan operations, concludes this review of the Bank's  Methods used to evaluate project outcomes could be
record on reform of tax systems in the 1990s.  better and more uniform.
The Bank's theoretical basis for reforming tax and  Suggestions  for future Bank operations:
customs administration is still rudimentary.  Recent  *  Doing better background work and articulating a
theories stress the importance of institutions that harness  strategy and comprehensive framework for Bank
voice and improve transparency and contestability, but  involvement in reform of tax administration.
there is little evidence that reform of these factors alone  * Possibly supporting and strengthening regional tax
makes tax administration more effective.  administration associations, which could serve as
Improvements are needed in pre-project diagnosis and  catalysts for change.
project design, especially for examining accountability,  Strengthening partnering and supporting private
administration costs, managerial autonomy, performance  sector consultant organizations, so they can manage
incentives for staff, taxpayer equity and services, and  major components of administrative reform.
environmental factors. Pre-project work could draw  *  Institutionalizing the accumulation of knowledge
more systematically on lessons from previous experience.  about tax administration (which might require changing
Institutional components of project design have been  staff recruitment,  the mix of staff skills, and training
biased toward organization, manpower  upgrading, and  plans).
procedures related to information technology. Too little  The authors provide recommendations  for improvin-g
attention has been paid to improving accountability,  project diagnosis, design, performance indicators, and
administrative cost-effectiveness, and anticorruption  appraisal, as well as a short list of projects that serve as
institution-building.  guides to good practice.
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Summary
This  paper provides  an assessment  of the World  Bank's record in helping  its clients  promote  tax
system reforms during the  1990s.  World Bank advice and lending operations have been
concentrated  on both policy  reform  and reform  of the administration  of tax systems. This paper
is primarily  concerned  with the latter. Its main conclusion  is that substantial  improvements  can
be expected  in project design, execution,  and, ultimately,  effectiveness,  if a more concerted
approach  to institutional  analysis  of the tax environment  is adopted.
Objectives  and  approach.  The use of institutional  analysis  in the design  of operations  in support
to refonn of public  institutions,  of which tax and customs  administration  are important  areas of
concentration,  is now an essential  requirement  in the World  Bank. No formal  methodology  for
institutional  analysis  has yet been developed  in this area. However,  institutional  concerns  have
always  been high in the preoccupation  of task  managers,  who have striven  to incorporate  them
even without formal methodological  guidelines. This paper proposes a  methodology for
institutional  analysis,  based on ongoing  work in the Bank  and elsewhere,  and then reviews  tax
and customs  reforms  operations  during  the 1990s  to assess  the extent  to which  they incorporate
this methodology.  As can be expected,  since hindsight  is 20/20, deficiencies  are not hard to
identify. The paper then proceeds to recommend  steps to improve the institutional  analysis
methodology  employed.  It should  be noted that the paper does not attempt,  except in minor
ways, to assess the effectiveness  and sustainability  of the operations  reviewed,  since many of
them are still  ongoing,  or completion  information  is not available.
Analysis in this review  and major  findings: Of about 120  lending  operations  in the 1990s  with
components  seeking  to strengthen  some  aspect  of the tax system,  43 projects  with an outlay  of
US$3.8  billion  had major tax or customs  administration  reform  components  and 40 others  had
important  components  addressing  other  aspects  of tax systems.  Regional  emphasis  has gradually
shifted from Latin America  and the Carribean  (LAC) and Africa (AFR) to East Europe  and
Central Asia (ECA) during the decade, and there has been a decline in the total outlay from
US$5.1  billion  during  1990-94  to US$3.6  billion  during 1995-1998.
For the 43 operations  with an administrative  focus, major objectives  cited most often were
revenue enhancement  (40%), strengthening  administrative  institutions (37%) and promoting
macroeconomic  stability and growth (28%). Improving  accountability  taxpayer  education  and
services  was a major  objective  in very few  operations  (7%  and 5% respectively),  while  no project
had a major  focus  on strengthening  voice  and participation.
The framework  used in this paper  to examnine  pre-project  diagnostic  work of tax systems  in these
43 operations assesses  project documents  according to how adequately  they addressed  key
features of the operating environment  (policy formulation,  accountability,  service delivery
effectiveness  and  efficiency)  according  to their performance,  capacity,  institutional  arrangements
and exogenous  constraints.Turning to components  included in project design, computerization  and related procedural,
organizational  and manpower  reforms  were most popular,  the former figuring  in all technical
assistance  and related  (TLSR)  loans. On the other hand, besides the limited presence  of anti-
corruption and institutions  for accountability  and budgetary resources, the conclusions  for
structural and sectoral adjustment loans (SALs/SECALs)  in  a  1997 Operations  Evaluation
Department  (OED) study,' that a greater focus is needed on "conducive  legal environment,
taxpayer education,  information  systems (used by tax departments),  audits, withholding  and
presumptive  taxation and improvements  in VAT administration"  are confirmed  for structural
adjustment  operations  reviewed  here and, excluding  VAT administration  and taxpayer audits,
technical  assistance  operations  as well.
The specification  and use of performance  indicators,  especially quantitative  indicators,  was
limited,  especially  in SALs/SECALs  and there was little uniformity  across  loans.  Furthermore,
few operations established pre-project benchmarks for  indicators, and  there was  limited
correspondence  between  indicators  used in pre-project  and post-project  appraisals.  Insufficient
infornation on the rationale  for sequencing  of different  project components  prevents  any firm
conclusion  from  being  drawn  here.  Nevertheless,  instances  of both effective  and  poor sequencing
are reported  in post-project  evaluation  documents.
Only a handful  of projects  undertook  quantitative  project appraisal  and risk assessment.  Where
these were done, methods used were not uniform across projects and appear capable of
improvement.
Since many operations are still active, a relatively small set of post-project  Implementation
Completion  and (OED)  Project  Audit  reports  were available.  This sample,  however,  confirms  the
importance  of Bank  and borrower  performance  and quality  at entry for project  success  found in
earlier  work  in the Bank.  In addition,  lessons  distilled  from projects  largely  pertained  to project
implementation  rather  than  to improving  the content  of projects  at the design  stage.
Suggestions  for future operations: Upstream work to draw up a strategy for Bank operations in
the area  of revenue  administration,  including  the content  and  the process  of such operations,  is a
major suggestion  made here. Among process factors, outsourcing,  strengthening  of external
partnerships  and strengthening  the skill mix of Bank staff are important  components  of the
strategy.
The need for a standard  diagnostic  tool 2, a greater focus on and integration  of governance
components  in project design, the development  and use of a  standard set of administration
performance indicators and  also  a  standard appraisal methodology are  other  important
suggestions  made here. In addition,  a formal hypothesis-testing  framework  to distill lessons
about  best practices  in revenue  administration  is needed  to strengthen  the content  of future  Bank
operations.
'Datta-Mitra  (1997).
2  example, the tool developed within the Tax Policy and Administrative Group by Gill (1998).
iiREFORMING TAx  SYSTEMS:
Ti-E WORLD  BANK  RECORD  IN THE 1990s
This review  of Bank  projects  in the 1990s  with tax or customs  administration  components  aims
to analyze  the extent  and nature  of their institutional  focus.  A second  objective  is to identify  and
assess  the performance  indicators  used. The purpose  of the review  is to draw lessons  for future
Bank  work  in the area of tax systems  advice.
The paper discussed  the rationale for involvement  in tax reform; the nature of pre-project
diagnostic  work  in projects;  the composition  of the 83 projects  with tax systems  components;  key
features  of project design; the nature of performance  indicators  specified  in projects;  project
appraisal;  selected aspects of project implementation;  and evaluation  of project outcomes.
Conclusions  and suggestions  for future  Bank  loans  for administrative  reform  are  then offered.
1.  The  Why:  Rationale  for Bank  Lending  for Tax  Systems  Reform
The corporate  objective  of the World Bank group is to reduce world poverty. Growth and
macroeconomic  stability  are necessary  pre-conditions  to reduce  poverty. The need  to strengthen
revenue  generation  has traditionally  been  a self-evident  task of development,  which  the Bank  has
chosen  to pursue  with a variety  of means.
Whereas  policy  advice  on revenue  architecture  has been and continues  to be a prominent  part of
the Bank's analytical  support  to countries,  there  has been  increasing  realization  that good  policies
alone are insufficient  for sustained,  reliable revenue  generation,  which in turn is a necessary
condition  for both macroeconomic  stability  and provision of adequate social services  by the
Government.  In the medium  to long term, evidence  shows  that strong  institutions,  particularly
institutions  of governance  are as if not more important  to achieve  sustained  growth  and poverty
reduction.  There is also some evidence  showing  that this applies  to revenue generation.  Good
institutions  in government  ensure  effective  policy  making,  accountability  for their actions  of the
government  and its functionaries  to citizens,  and effective  and efficient service  delivery. Key
requirements  for these outcomes  are transparent  procedures,  mechanisms  to involve  citizens  in
decision making and  evaluation,  and enforcement  of  accountability  especially to  counter
corruption and  waste.  Consequently institutional strengthening and  governance  capacity
building  have, of late, become  integral  to the Bank's  development  strategy  and to its technical
assistance  (TA)  operations. 3 In the next  few sections,  we will examine  the extent  to which  these
concerns  have  been  already  incorporated  in Bank  work  in the tax system  reform  area.
3 For example,  the Operation  Policy  Department's  Handbook  of Technical  Assistance  (1993)  defines  two kinds  of
TA, Institutional  Development  TA and  Gap Filling  TA and  proceeds  to devote  the bulk  of the Handbook  to the
former.  Furthermore,  it is critical  of traditional  approaches  to gap  filling  TA. The  list of core  institutional  functions
listed  in  the Handbook  include  policy  making;  financial  resource  generation  and allocation;  managing  personnel;
communication;  management;  evaluation;  and  meeting  citizen's  needs.
12.  The How: Features of World Bank Intervention in Tax System Reform
Magnitude.  There is no doubt that the World Bank, de facto,  is strongly committed to revenue
system reforms among its  member countries.  During the  1990s, a total  of about  120 loan
operations in  67 countries had  components dealing with  reforming some aspect of the  tax
system 4 and involved an outlay of about US$13.9 billion (Table 1). In 37 of these loans, tax
system reform was  a  component of  a  broader structural reform program. In  the  other  83
operations in 55 countries involving an outlay of  US$8.5 billion, greater attention was devoted
to the tax system. In 43 of these projects, modernization of tax or customs administration was a
major or a principal component and involved a loan outlay of around $4.7 billion.
Table  1.  Projects  Classified  by Type of Lending Instrument
(83 projects with a tax system component during the 199 0s)
Number of  Number of Projects  Value (US$ million)  Average per Project
Countries  (US$ million)
SALs and SECALs  36  51  7673.7  150.5
TALs  17  20  351.9  17.6
LILs, SILs and RILs  9  12  457.3  38.1
All Projects  55  83  8482.9  102.2
SAL: Structural adjustment Loan.  LIL: Learning and Innovation Loan.
SECAL: Sectoral Adjustment Credit.  SIL: Specific Investrnent Loan.
TAL: Technical Assistance Loan.  RIL: Rehabilitation  Loan.
Table 2 lists the main objectives of the 43 loans with a major tax or customs modernization
component.  The  list  of  possible  objectives  in  the  table  was  pre-specified  in  line  with  the
institutional  focus  of  this  review  (this  explains  the  zero  value  for  the  objective  Strengthen
citizen's voice and participation). The table shows that explicit institutional objectives were the
focus of relatively few projects. Not surprisingly, the most common institutional development
objective  was  direct  strengthening  of tax  administration  institutions  (37%  of projects),  which
mainly  translates  into  strengthening  organization,  management,  procedures,  and  information
processing.  Key institutional  objectives  such as strengthening  accountability,  anti-corruption  and
voice  were  major  objectives  in  relatively  few  projects.  Macroeconomic  stability,  revenue
enhancement  and,  possibly,  improving  taxpayer  compliance  are  the  three  non-institutional
objectives  in the list.
4 Here "tax system" is taken to include tax structure, the administration of taxes including customs administration,
the institutional framnework  of tax policy and the environmental and institutional framework of tax administration.
2Table  2. Major  Project  Objectives
(43  projects  with  a major  administration  component)
Objective  Number  of projects  Percentage  of
projects
1.  Revenue  enhancement  17  39.5
2.  Strengthen  administrative  institutions  16  37.2
3.  Macroeconomic  stability  12  27.9
4.  Improve  environmental  institutions  8  18.6
5.  Strengthen  administrative  capacity  7  16.3
6.  Improve  taxpayer  compliance  6  14.0
7.  Strengthen  accountability  3  7.0
8.  Strengthen  anti-corruption  2  4.7
9.  Improve  taxpayer  services  2  4.7
10. Improve  taxpayer  education  2  4.7
11. Strengthen  voice  and participation  0  0.0
12. Others  9  20.9
Number  of major  objectives  in 43 projects  85
Notes:  Each  project  can have  more  than  one major  objective
Basic Features of Projects With Tax System Components
Basic statistics of projects  included in  the sample  used in  this  review are presented here.
Projects are classified by loan type, by the importance of tac system components in loan design,
by region and by the type of tax system components included in the  project.
Table 1 showed that the bulk of loan activity for tax system reform was through SALs/SECALs
and that these structural adjustment loans were, on average 5 to 8 times larger than the average
TLSR loan (i.e. TALs, LILs, SILs and RILs). Almost all SALs/SECALs involved more than just
tax  system reform components. Information about loan fractions specifically for tax  system
reform was only available in a few cases. Instead, in Table 3, where the distribution of loans
according to the importance of the tax system component is given, average loan amounts for
projects where this component is the principal or a major component can be seen to be around
$110 million for SALs/SECALs and $25 million for TLSR loans.
Table  3. Projects  Classified  by  Importance  of Tax System  Components
(83  projects  with  a tax system  component  during  the 1990s)
Number  of Countries  I Number  of Projects  Value  (US$  million)
All Projects  in the Sample
Major  or Principal  Component  31  43  4712.2
One  of Several  or Minor  Component  24  40  3770.8
TALs, LILs, SILs and RILs
Major  or Principal  Component  20  22_  550.2
One of Several  or Minor  Component  1  8  10  259.0
Loan volume was lower during 1995-1998 compared to the first 5 years of the 1990s (Table 4)
for both categories of loans. Furthermore, regionally, emphasis shifted from Latin America and
the Carribean (LAC) and Africa regions (AFR) to Europe and Central Asia (ECA). No new loans
3were made to the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) and South Asia region (SAR) during
1995-98,  though at least 3 new loans are in the pipeline.
Table  4. Projects  Classified  by  Region
(83  projects  with  a tax system  component  during  the 1990s)
All Projects  TALs,  LILs,  SILs  and  RILs
1990-1994  1995-1998  1990-1994  1995-1998
Projects  Value  Projects  Value  Projects  Value  Projects  Value
(Number) (US$  107)  (Number)  (US$  107)  (Number)  (US$ 107)  (Number) (US$  107)
AFR  21  1205.8  12  980.8  6  142.1  1  23.8
ECA  3  487.0  17  2108.2  2  37.0  9  175.2
EAP  4  203.0  1  25.0  4  203.0  1  25.0
LAC  16  2046.0  3  252.2  6  131.0  2  52.2
MNA  3  444.9  1  80.0  1  19.9  0  0.0
SAR  2  650.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0
TOTAL  49  5143.7  34  3553.2  19  533.0  13  276.2
Disaggregating loan components  firther,  customs  reform  components were  most  frequent
overall, though tax administration reform components predominated in TLSR operations (Table
5). Of special interest is the importance given to the VAT in tax structure modernization and to
computerization  in the area of administrative  modernization.
Table 5. Projects Classified by Type of Tax System Component
(83 projects with a tax system component during the 1990s)
All  Projects  TALs,  LILs, SILs  and  RILs
Number  Number  Value  Number  Number  Value
of  of  (US$  of  of  (US$
Countries  Projects  million)  Countries  Projects  million)
With a Customs Reform Component  41  57  6203.3  11  14  269.6
With a Domestic Tax Administration  45  64  5819.9  24  29  679.2
Component
With a Domestic Tax Reform  30  46  4920.4  8  9  175.0
Component
With a Tariff Reform Component  31  41  4773.9  2  2  78.0
With a VAT Component  22  31  3633.2  5  6  67.5
With a Computerization  Component  31  38  3050.0  22  26  670.0
With a focus on particular taxes only*  6  7  479.3  1  1  24.3
Notes: Projects may be counted more than once.
* Included are social security, property taxes, forest tax, petroleum tax, stamp tax and their administrations.
2.  Building Sound Projects: Pre-project  Diagnostic Work
After describing a framework for  institutional assessment (Table 6),  information on the presence
of diagnostic work in different projects is presented  Six broad areas are examined. tax policy
institutions;  tax  structure;  tax  or  customs  administration  effectiveness;  tax  or  customs
administration efficiency; the institutional and economic environment of administration; and the
institutions and capacity of the tax administration. This discussion is then summarized and the
4comprehensiveness of diagnosis in the typical project  discussed  The section closes with an
examination of the extent to which  pre-project work discusses lessons  from earlier experience.
In a recent Bank study, Evans and Battaile (1998) present evidence that good Bank performance
is  a  key  determinant  of  successful project  outcomes, being  dominated only  by  borrower
performance. The most important ingredient of good Bank performance identified in the study is
the quality-at-entry of a project. Thus the importance of thorough pre-project preparation and
diagnostic work.
In order to evaluate the way in which Bank projects have incorporated institutional concerns in
their design, we have analyzed existing documentation against a framework summarized in the
matrix in Table 6. In this framework, 5 Performance is a function of Capacity, Institutions and
Exogenous  constraints. Furthermore performance is  disaggregated into policy  formulation,
accountability and service delivery with the latter being divided further into effectiveness and
efficiency. Effectiveness refers to the quality and quantity of services provided while efficiency
deals with the unit cost of service provision. 6 Tables Al through A6 in appendix report the extent
to which different diagnostic areas were examined in the 43 projects with major tax/customs
administration components. A summary, which also shows the overall comprehensiveness of
diagnostic exercises in the typical project, is in Table 7.
It  should be made clear that, in  compiling project data, no judgement was made about the
adequacy or completeness of the diagnosis in any category in SARs or MOPs since other pre-
project documents, if any, were largely unavailable for this review. 7
On the basis of the data in table 7, we can infer the following conclusions:
*  Tax policy  institutions  and  tax  structure: Tax  policy  making  and  analysis institutions
received attention in only about one quarter of projects in the sample. Regarding tax structure
and revenue performance, diagnosis was typically limited to standard  tax features such as the
tax to  GDP ratio; mix of taxes; tax rates, bases and exemptions; and their recent reform
history. Within this set, disaggregated  analysis was less common than aggregate information.
Quantitative and  formal  analysis, such  as  analysis using  relatively  standard tools  like
effective rates, buoyancy and elasticity was relatively rare. Formal econometric modeling
was reported in only 2 projects. Furthermore, the extent of analysis of these areas present in
TLSR  projects tended  to  be  lower than  in  SALs/SECALs. Infirmities diagnosed were
typically limited to only the major features that were against good practice, such as high and
differentiated rates, narrow bases, multiple exemptions and input taxation (i.e. absence of a
VAT). Most projects, furthermore, did not cite references to Bank or other work discussing
"good" tax design. 8
Inspired  by Nick  Manning  and Brian  Levy  in various  unpublished  work.
6 Further disaggregation  of the categories  in the table is to be found in the diagnostic  and project formulation
framework  of Gill (1998), though diagnostic  categories  are classified  differently  there. Other, less detailed,
diagnostic  frameworks  are to be found  in Bagchi,  Bird  and Das-Gupta  (1995),  Datta-Mitra  (1997),  Annex  4, and in
Vazquez-Caro,  Reid  and Bird  (1992).
7In  point  of fact,  diagnosis  in most SARs  and  MOPs,  if not supplemented  by other  documents,  was mostly
inadequate  and  furthermore,  coverage  within  different  categories  was  typically  incomplete.
s See,  for example,  World  Bank  (1991),  Khalilzadeh  Shirazi  and Shah  (1991)  and  Gillis,  Sicat  and  Shoup  (1990).
5*  Effectiveness: Analysis  of  effectiveness (meaning 'both  raising  adequate revenues  and
enforcing compliance, and providing a high level of services to taxpayers) was relatively
limited and mostly qualitative, especially in SALs/SECALs. Quantitative examination of this
key aspect of administrative performiance  was absent in the bulk of projects.
*  Efficiency: The focus of analysis, especially in TLSR projects, was typically technology
driven, examining the  lack of  sufficient automation and  the consequent inefficiency of
different activities or functions. Privatization of functions was mainly limited to discussion of
tax collection through  banks, withholding and  use  of pre-shipment  inspection services.
Manpower  analysis focused  on  overstaffing  and  less  commonly  on  the  efficiency  of
deployment to different functions. A major weakness, especially of most SALs/SECALs was
the lack of attention to the cost of tax administration and tax administration budgets.
*  Administration Environment: General economic conditions followed by taxpayer compliance
levels and tax policy constraints were the environmental factors analyzed in the bulk  of
projects. Analysis of institutions was less common, with  SALs/SECALs having a  higher
incidence, often by  virtue of these operations having other loan components covering a
broader area. However, discussion was disjoint, with attempt seldom being made to draw
conclusions  for the evaluation of tax or customs administration.
*  Institutions and Capacity: Analysis in this area focused, in most projects, on organization
structure, technology, manpower quality, and tax administration procedures. Few projects
paid attention to the presence and effectiveness of accountability institutions such as external
audits or other external monitoring (e.g. voice and feedback) or to administrative autonomy
and budgets.  In  sum,  inadequate attention was paid  in  sample projects to  institutional
determinants of performance.
6Table 6. A Framework for Diagnosis of Tax System Weaknesses
Characteristic  Perfonnance (usually  Capacity  Institutions  Exogenous and environmental
quantitative indicators)  constraints
Policy  *  Simplicity, equity and  *  Human resource quality and  *  Division of powers  *  Level of economic
Formulation  Comprehensiveness of  quantity for policy  *  Legal provisions governing  development
Administrative Law  formulation and research  administration  *  Openness
*  Simplicity, equity and  *  Training facilities  *  Administrative autonomy  *  Commercial development
Comprehensiveness of  *  Budget determination  *  Extent of transition to market
taxpayer related procedures  procedures  *  Accountancy profession and
*  Effectiveness of strategic  '  Organization structure  standards
management decisions  *  Political interference in  *  Financial and banking
administrative decisions  development
Appropriateness of tax  Literacy
structure  S  Legal conventions,
Accountability  *  Corruption  *  Human and non-human  *  Internal and external audit  constitutional law
*  Revenue loss due to  resource quality and quantity  *  Ombudsman  *  Law and order
administrative lapses  in management inspection,  *  Taxpayer survey process  *  Compliance attitudes of
*  Taxpayer survey  audit, vigilance and  *  Vigilance  taxpayers
anticorruption  *  Penalty structure and  *  Credibility of govermnent
*  Training facilities for  effectiveness for administrators  *  Government stability
accountability staff  *  Reward structure and  *  Civil service conditions
*  Civil society involvement  effectiveness
*  Performance evaluation
procedure and execution for
staff and administrative units
Service  *  Revenue to potential  *  Human and non-human  0  Adequacy of procedures for
delivery:  revenue indicators  resource quality and quantity  different internal activities and
*  Activity-wise effectiveness  *  In administrative activities  taxpayer related activities
Effectiveness  indicators  *  Recruitment Career paths,  including:
Service  *  Revenue to cost indicators  promotion and transfer  Compliance, valuation,
delivery:  *  Time indicators  policies  taxpayer identification, tax
Efficiency  Taxpayer survey  Wages, bonuses and pay  audit, taxpayer education,
determination  taxpayer services, tax
*  Training facilities  collection, tax sanctions, tax
*  Automation  appeals, border inspection and
*  Budget size of administration  clearance procedures, special
*  Financial, personnel,  customs procedures,
equipment and activity  warehousing, preshipment
management  formalities, post clearance
*  Feasibility and extent of  checks, information exchange
outsourcing  and privatization  and sharing  arrangements
7Table  7. Comprehensiveness  of Diagnosis
(43 projects with a major administration component)
(Percentage of categories examined:  average per project)
Area of Diagnosis  Number of sub-areas  TALs, LILs,  SALs and
examined  for this review  SILs, RILs  SECALs
Taxpayer obligations, laws and procedures  1  57.1  61.9
Tax Structure Indicators and Analysis  13  48.3  61.6
Of which buoyancies/ elasticities!  otherformal analysis  2  17.5  19.0
recent reform history  2  54.5  87.5
Environmental Indicators and analysis  8  47.7  34.9
Institutional Indicators and analysis  13  42.6  28.6
Of which budget size and determination  procedures  2  7.1  14.3
Efficiency indicators and analysis  11  37.6  19.7
Of which tcac  collection cost indicators  29.5  0.0
Effectiveness indicators and analysis  7  30.7  17.7
Of which corruption indicators  I  22.7  23.8
Tax Policy Institutions  I  22.7  28.6
Average number of categories examined  63  39.2  34.1
Notes: 1. See the notes to Table 4.3.
2. In case one or more areas not included in the basic inventory used for this study were examined in a project, a
"normalizing"  procedure whereby both numerator and denominator  are increased by the number of "other" areas,
was used to compute the diagnosis percentage for the project.
In sum, in the average project less than 40% of diagnostic categories considered in this review
were  included  in  the  diagnosis.  Furthernore,  the  failure  to  use  quantitative perforrnance
indicators is even more widespread.
One  should  note  however  that  averages mask  substantial differences.  To  highlight  the
"positives" available in our sample, two of a handful of exceptional projects are reviewed in Box
2 and a case study is offered in Box 3 below. In all three cases, it is evident that the project team
took pains to ensure that the information available from the diagnostic work was first of all
sufficiently comprehensive,  and subsequently incorporated  into the design of the operation.
5.  What Have We Tried to Accomplish?  Key Features  of Project Design
This section examines the extent to which different components are present  in projects in the
sample, the comprehensiveness  or, conversely, degree offocus  of the average operation and the
sequencing of components. Corresponding  to the  framework of the previous section, components
are divided into 4 broad areas, tax structure; the tax administration environment; different
functions of tax administration; and institutional strengthening and capacity building. Special
attention is given to trade tax and customs reform projects. The coordination of design with
other projects and key features of implementation  planning are then examined
8Box 2: Pre-Project Diagnosis in ColombiaW  and Jamaica;
Careful  diagnosis  of tax administration  performance,  tracing  weaknesses  to inadequate  institutional,  capacity  or
environmental  causes  is important  for sound  project  formulation.  The tax administration  reform  project  component  in the
1993  Colombia  Public  Financial  Management  project  and the 1994  Jamaica  Tax  Administration  Refonn  Project  are among
the handfull  of projects  with  relatively  comprehensive  diagnostic  work.  Importantly,  in addition  to the diagnostic  work,  both
projects  drew  on lessons  learned  from previous  tax administration  projects  both  for project  design  and for the
implementation.  In both  projects,  diagnosis  and lessons  of experience  were  closely  tied to project  design.
Colonmia:  The  diagnostic  work  (Annex  9 of the Staff  Appraisal  Report,  pp. 1-22)  examines:
1.  Administration  reform  history.
2.  The economic  base  covering  major  phases  in recent  fiscal  and economic  history,  economic  growth  and its sectoral
pattems,  international  capital  flows,  inflation,  and the distribution  of voluntary  and  enforcement  based  tax collection
according  to categories  of taxpayers.
3.  Legislative  developments  in substantive  tax laws  and recent  tax reforn history.
4.  Reform  of procedural  laws  (e.g.  filing  and  withholding  obligations,  tax penalties,  tax amnesties,  tax registration  and
taxpayer  documentation).
5.  Organizational  reforrns  within  the administration  and  stemmning  from such  things  as out-sourcing  tax collection  to banks.
6.  Induction  of IT and  associated  managerial  and procedural  reforms.
7.  Infrastructure  for human  resource  development,  personnel  policies,  developments  and incentive  structures.
8.  Operational  procedures  including  tax auditing,  collection  and  internal  administration.
9.  Organizational  structure  of administration  (including  detailed  organization  diagrams  at different  levels  starting  with
inter-department  coordination  in the parent  ministry).
On the basis  of this diagnosis,  key  areas  of weakness  in the legal  frnework,  informnatics  and  resource  and operations
management  were identified  and form  the basis  of project  design.
Jamaica:  The diagnostic  work  in the Staff  Appraisal  Report  for this  project  is even  more  detailed  than that  for Colombia,
and is presented  in  9 Annexes  covering  61 pages.  On the basis  of the diagnosis  key weaknesses,  in  the tax administration  are
identified  (Section  B of the SAR)  and a strategy  for  the reform  of tax administration  formulated  (Section  C of the SAR).  The
major  areas  covered  in the diagnosis  are:
1.  The  tax structure  including  overall  revenue  performance  and  tax by tax discussion  of rates,  base,  exclusions  and revenue
performance.
2.  The withholding  tax structure  and its management.
3.  Formal  estimates  of revenue  collection  gaps  by tax, by selected  taxpayer  types,  by economic  sector  and  activity  wise
(e.g.  non-filers  versus  under  reporting).
4.  A discussion  of tax policy  issues  requiring  resolution  to increase  taxpayer  equity  and  reduce  economic  distortions.
5.  Computerization  of the tax admninistration
6.  Training  capacity  and provision  in  the tax administration.
7.  Taxpayer  auditing.
8.  The legal  and  procedural  framework:  of tax administration  (including  resources  organization  and management  of audits
and investigation,  equipment  shortages  and attitudinal  concerns:  searches  and  field  operations;  enforcement  powers  of
administration;  tax assessment;  tax appeals;  tax collection;  administrative  discretion;  and  harnonization  of provisions  in
different  tax statutes).
9.  Management  of tax collection.
From  a comparison  of the areas  covered  in the two  projects  it will be clear  that  there are areas  that  are not covered  in each
diagnosis.  Furthermore,  the depth  of coverage  is not uniform  in all  areas  or across  the two  projects.  Additional  areas
requiring  diagnosis  can also  be identified,  important  anong them  being institutional  weaknesses  in controlling  corruption
and  support  for economic  evaluation  of tax structures.  The use  of quantitative  performance  indicators  is also  somewhat
limited.  Finally,  the review  of lessons  of experience  fall  well short  of articulating  either  a clearly  specified  theory  of effective
and efficient  tax administration  or a conceptual  framework  for  project  implementation.  Nevertheless,  these  diagnostic
exercises  clearly  pernitted  the design  of high  value  added  reform  projects.
Colombia  Public  Financial  Management  Project,  Oct 21, 1993,  Project  ID CR-PE-6889.
Jamaica  tax Administration  Reforn Project,  May  24, 1994,  Project  ID JM-PE-7489.
9Box 3. Balancing  iComputers  and  Institution  Building:
The QAG  Best  Practice  Project  in Latvia
Computerization  often  becomes  and end instead  of a tool in  many  tax administration  reform  projects.  In contrast
parallel institution building, necessary for sustainable reform, is often inadequately addressed. 7he State Revenue
Modernization  Project  in Latvia could have gone the same way as, originally, the Latvian government was
primarily  looking  for  assistance  with  information  technology.  However,  witli  help from  the World  Bank,  the
government  integrated  an "Institutional  Development"  component  in  the project  design.  The  result  was a 'Highly
Satisfactory'  and  a 'Best  Practice' ranking  from  Quality  Assurance  Group's (QAG)  Quality  At Entry  Assessment'
for 'sustainable  institutional  reform'.  The  balancing  of institutional  development  and information  technology  is
what  is considered  best  practice  and  the major  value  addition  by Bank.
What  were  thefactors  fr  the Best  Practice  rating  :
Te Quality  at Entry  Assessment  gave  Latvia  a highly  satisfactory  ranking  in  7 out of 8  applicable  dimensions.  The
most important  factors  mentioned  by the QAG  are:
Project  Concept,  Objectives  and  Approach
*  The  Govemment  of Latvia  took  the initiative.  They  only  requested  help from  the Bank  after considerable  prior
work  and  a Cabinet  discussion  of the issues.  The  Govemment  showed  commitment  by providing  almost  90%  of
project  cost.
. In preparatory  work  important  institutional  issues  such as "vulnerability  to corruption"  and "institutional  gaps"
were addressed.
*  The Govemrnent  had  clear objectives  for both  tax reform  and capacity  building  to qualify  for EU  entry.
*  The project utilized relevant lessons of experience in project design and implementation  such as introducing
perfornance  indicators  as benchmarks  for revenue  agency  staff  and  managers,  and  complementing  the IT-
dominated  operational  components  with  corrmponents  aimed  at the organizational  and management  aspects  of
revenue  administration.
I  An alternative  project  design  was considered  and  dropped  because  of clear criteria,
Institutional Capacity  Analysis
*  There  was  excellent  balance  between  institutional  and information  technology  needs.
*  There  was  excellent  explanation  of the central  importance  of institutional  development  for sustainable
development  of capacity.
*  A comprehensive  analysis  of the executing  agency's  capacity  and incentives  to carry  out its mission  was
included.  The  diagnostic  document  is also  best  practice.  It identifies  gaps and  solutions,  and served  as the base
for project  design.
Other  dimensions  considered  for the overall  ranking  were:  Environmental  Aspect,  Social  and Stakeholder  Aspects,
Financial  Management  Aspects,  Readiness  for  Irnplementation,  Risk  Assessment  and Sustainability  and Bank  Inputs
and Processes.
Stakeholder analysis
A limitation  of the project  design  process,  according  to the QAG  report  is its apparently  limited  assessment  and
incorporation  of stakeholder  views.  It was considered  too difficult  to arrange  the necessary  dialogue  to involve
direct  participation  of taxpayers  in the project,  although  the Project  Appraisal  Document  (PAD)  reports  brief
surveys  of businesses,  households,  public  officials  and taxpayers,  to incorporate  their perceptions  of the SRS  in
project  development,  The PAD  reports  that  consultations  were also  carried  out  with  major  accounting  firms,  along
with  "selected"  large  taxpayers  during  pre-appraisal  but notes  that  project  design  primarily  reflecs work  of SRS
staff  and management.
'Latvia, State  Revenue  Service  Modernization  P?roject,  October  30, 1998,  QAG,  Quality  at Entry  Assessment
10The  previous  section  has  documented  the  extent  to  which  institutional  concerns  were
incorporated  in project diagnostic. Tables A6 to A9 in the appendix provide detailed information
on the  features of the  projects under  examination, which were, presumably, driven by  the
diagnostic. 9 The popularity and  unpopularity of  different components roughly parallels the
pattern found in project diagnostic work:
*  Tax structure reform, which was present in most SALs/SECALs,  tended to concentrate on
basic broad-based  taxes on income sales and imports.
*  The most important tax reform in TLRS projects was VAT introduction or streamlining.
*  Administratively convenient presumptive taxes received little attention. In three projects
among those looking at turnover taxes, the objective was to abolish the tax and replace it
with the less distortionary VAT.
*  Roughly 50% of projects had components addressing one or more tax policy institutions.
*  Environmental institutional components in TSRL projects tended to focus on laws and legal
provisions relevant to tax administration and enforcement or on strengthening tax collection
capacity of banks.  SALs/SECALs, while addressing more institutional components on a
wider  front,  seldom coordinated these  components with  tax  or  customs  administration
components.
*  Tax administration functional  components tended to  concentrate on the basic functions,
identification, assessment, audit and collection, and for customs, cargo clearance.
c  Taxpayer education, improving taxpayer services  were relatively neglected.
c  Contrary to expectations, components to set up or strengthen large taxpayer units, were
present in less than half the projects. Thus, contrary to a widely held belief, Bank projects
design followed the IMF's lead less than is believed to be the case OR large taxpayer
units are far from  lde  rigueur in IMF administration refomi packages.  10
- Administrative institutions and capacity: On the other hand computerization components
were found in all TSRL projects, though the emphasis given to it varied from being a minor
part of the project with no expenditure on equipment, software or technical expertise, to
being the primary focus of a project (irn 8 TSRL projects). Most projects with a  strong
computerization focus  were  accompanied by  organizational, procedural and  manpower
reforms together with training activity. In fact, these institutional components were absent in
some projects.
In compiling  information  on inclusion  of project  components,  one  problem  to be tackled  was  the fact  that a project
could seldom  be expected  to have a comprehensive  design,  either because  of borrower  needs and priorities  or
because  wide-ranging  projects  could end up straining  the borrower's  change  absorption  capacity  (as  happened  in at
least two projects  in the sample).  Yet, a picture of areas stressed  and not stressed  in Bank work could only be
obtained  if the reformn  history  encompassing,  in particular,  components  of previous  projects  in a country  was taken
into account. To meet this need, components were  deemed to be included in a project if they were included in
parallel or past projects or were judged in diagnostic work to be adequate. Thus the frequency of inclusion of
different components reflects how often components were ever included or were thought not to need reform. Low
frequencies, therefore, imply a neglect of the concerned component in Bank project design.
'0 Compare the third column of Table 5.6 below.
11*  Paralleling the pattern documented for project diagnosis, limited attention was paid to
strengthening accountability and monitoring, to increasing administration autonomy, to
improving  budgetary  processes  or  improving  performance  (wage)  incentives  for
personnel.
Trade  policy and customs  project design: In order to provide a clearer picture of the design of
trade policy and customs projects than is available from this analysis, Box 4 summarizes key
features of around 15 projects with trade or customs reform components. Additionally, a key
controversy in the area of tax (actually customs) adrninistration privatization, pre-shipment
inspection is reviewed in Box 5.
Box  4: Design  of Trade  and Customs  Reform  Operations:  Case Studiesl
Trade  Liberalization
In Argentina  in the  mid-1980's  the Bank  supported  the Goverment's policies  of providing  free  trade
status  to Argentine  exporters  and to remove  a large  number  of quantitative  restrictions.  In 1989  a new
loan  was granted  to support  Government's  efforts  to raise  the exposure  of domestic  industrial  production
to import  competition  without  QRs from  63%  to 85%  while  reducing  the average  level  of tariffs  from
41%  to 30%  and the maximum  tariff from 1  15%  to 50%. The  funds  were  disbursed  in two tranches  in
line  with the success  achieved  in obtaining  these  objectives.
The 1996  Yemen  and Jordan  programs  also aimed  at major  tariff and quota  reforms. In the case  of
Jordan  there was  also the objective  of preparing  the country  for the commitments  that  were to be made in
the context  ofthe Association  Agreement  with the European  Union  and its intended  accession  to the
WTO. in the case  of Jordan,  the project  was prepared  and followed  up with the assistance  of the USAID.
ISALs to Cameroon  and to Chad  assisted  these  Governments  to adjust  their  tariff structure  to the
common  UDEAC  tariff structure  as it was altered  in light  of the;  1994  devaluation  of the common
currency,  the CFAF.
In C6te  d'Ivoire,  a succession  of SALs  airned  to foster  the supply  response  to the 1994  CEAF
devaluation.  These  instruments  contained  measures  of tariff  reduction,  quota  relaxation  and improved
customs  operation.
In the 1993  SAL  for Jamaica,  an explicit  commitment  was  included  to bring  the tariff in line with the
Caribbean  Community  Common  External  Tariff
Revenue  nobilization
A 1997  Technical  Assistance  project  was  provided  to the Government  ofGuatemala,  with  the major
objective  to raise its  tax to GDP  ratio  above  the  6-9%  realized  in recent  years. This tax  administration
project  complemented  an IDB financed  projiect  to strength  Customs  Administration.
Several  operation  have  aimed  at modernizing  the customs  departments  alongside  with the Tax
Department  in transition  economies.  The 1995  AlbaniaTax  Administration  Modernization  Project,  had
as its main  objective  such modernization.  An agreement  was reached  between  the Govemment  and the
IMF  to use proceeds  from the loan  to compensate  the IMF for supervising  and managing  key technical
assistance  aspects  of the project. The 1993  Institution  Building  Loan  forArmenia included  a major
component  to (i) modernize  customs  laws  and regulations,  (ii) review  and reform  the organization  and
procedures  of the customs  operation,  and (iii) provide  training  for customs  classification  and valuation.
The Armenia  project  was prepared  and implemented  with the assistance  of UNCTAD.
12The 1994 Lebanon  Revenue  Enhancement  Project,  also aimed  to strengthen  customs  procedures  and
management.  The project  financed  reforms  of customs  procedures  and the installation  and
commissioning  of ASYCUDA++,  as well as its  translation  into  Arabic  with the involvement  of IJNCTAD
in preparation  and implementation.  The  work  done in Lebanon,  benefitedJordan  which  adopted  the
same  system.  The design  and rationale  of this project  was  independent  of Government  commitment  or
t decisions  with respect  to tariff reform  as it was  felt to be  justified in its own  right.
The 1996  Financial  Sector  Management  Project  in Turkey  (see also Box 7), contained  an important
customs  component  aimed  at shifting  from ex ante,  full coverage  cargo  examination  to a more  ex post
and efficiency  seeking  stance. The  project is relying  heavily  on training  and the implementation  of the
SOFIX  system  for computerization  of the  customs  procedures.  French  technical  assistance  has been
crucial in adapting this system to the Turkish requirements and the IMF manages major aspects of the
project.
Trade  Faciflaton
The 1993  Tax  Computerization  Project  for the Philippinesaimed  to provide  faster  and more  reliable
administration  of revenues  and in the process,  facilitate  private  sector  activities.  For customs
administration  it focused  on the computerization  of the customs  clearance  process,  involving  brokers,
importers  and customs  authorities. While  its primary  aim is to ensure  reliable  revenue  generation,
emphasis  is being  given  to easing  the administrative  burden  of the private  sector  from  -often  arbitrary  -
government  interference.  Crown  Agents,  selected  though  competitive  bidding,  worked  with  the Ministry
of Finance  and of the Bureau  of Customs  on the strategic  plan  and implementation  of the modernization
program.  The  IMF had extended  substantial  technical  assistance  in the areas  of revenue  procedures  and
institutional  strengthening.  With  UNCTAD  assistance  , the ASYCUDA-H  system  for customs  was
refined  to accommodate  the specific  Philippines  requirements  and was  complemented  with additional
modules,  while  a private  firm  was hired  to supply  the required  computer  equipment  and communication
system. Observers  suggest  that these  adjustments  and development  efforts  have  greatly  contributed  to
making  ASYCUDA++  a more  versatile  instrument  for customs  administration,  and have  benefited  more
recent adopters of the ASYCUDA++  system such as Lebanon and Jordan.
The Ghana  project  is an integral  part of reforms  required  to reach  Ghana's ambition  to become  a first
class trade and investment  center  on the West  African  coast. The  project  --called  the Gateway  project--
aims at improving  the infrastructure  of the maritime  ports and  the airport,  establish  Free  Trade  Zones
under  private  sector  operators,  and streamline  immigration  procedures  for investors  and tourists. But
foremost,  the project  aims  at assisting  Government  to bringing  the Customs  and Excises  Department  up
to the standards  of the International  Chamber  of Commerce  and ISO 9000. Again,  Crown  Agents  was
selected,  after  a competitive  bidding  process,  to help  the Customs  Departinent  to identify  shortcomings  of
the Departnent  and frame  a reform  program.  From  this followed  the action program  that aimed  at (i)
!  reducing  to one the number  of examination  points  and streamlining  cargo  documentation,  (ii) reduce
cargo  examination  from  100 0/o to I  00/o for statutory  free goods  and  200/a  for all dutiable  goods  (iii) adopt
the WTO  valuation  system, (iv) reduce  the number  of overland  customs  check  points,  and (v) start  a
specialized  customs  unit  to facilitate  the operation  of export  processing  zones. The  project  will  finance  a
business  plan  that streamlines  clearance  processes  so as to reduce  the clearance  time for import  and
export  cargo, re-equips  and installs  an adequate  information  technology  infrastructure,  and trains
customs  officials  in these new  procedures,  including  those  for free trade  zones. The  Project  will be
accompanied  by substantial  long-term  assistance  as well  as short-term  technical  assistance  in a number  of
specialized  areas.
IThis  box  is summarized  from  Luc  De Wulf  (1999)  Trade  Policies  and  Customs  Operations:  World  Bank  Interest,
processed,  Washington  D.C:  The World  Bank.
13Box 5: Privatization  in Customs: The Pre-Shipment  Inspection Controversy
An issue  that has raised  some  controversy  was the  decision  of the  Africa  Department  in the late 1980s
and early 1i990s  to require  most countries  that benefited  from  structural  adjustment  lending  to sign up for
a pre-shipment  inspection  (PSI)  service.  hle  concern  originally  rested  with the donor  community  that
wanted  additional  assurance  that the countries  that obtained  quick  disbursing  SAUSAC  financial
assistance  at easy  ter,ms  would  obtain  "value  for their money",  that is, that they would  import  the quantity
and quality of goods that were paid for by the grant and soft-loans, without any leakages.  Gradually,
however, revenue generation and anti-corruption concerns also led the donor community to look into the
i use of PSI services. A Bank research paperl studied the contribution that could be made by PSI
icompanies  and presented  some  guidelines  that, if followed,  would  help  countries  to benefits  from PSI
service.  These recomimendations  include competitive bidding for PSI services, mandating the recording
of the PSI findings  on the  customs  declaration,  requiring  a reconciliation  of the findings  of the PSI
findings with those used by the customs department in its determination of the duties owed, and ensuring
that a transparent and swift appeals procedture  exists to settle disputes.  Countries that have followed these
recommendations have benefited from PSI services. Others have paid dearly for services that they did
not use efficiently,  either  though  less  than  transparent  procurement  or by simply  ignoring  potentially
important  findings.  Currently,  the Bank's approach  to commercial  PSI services  depends  very much  on
particular  country  circumstances,  the Bank having  abandoned  the earlier  blanket  recommendation.
Furthernore, recent allegations of corruption in the case of a leading PSI company have cast further
doubt  on the effectiveness  of this strategy. An  issue  that remains  on the front bumer  though,  is how  to
reduce  over  time the reliance  on PSI services  and build  up national  iiistitutional  capacity  in the customs
departments.
Patrick  Low  (1995)  "Pre-Shipment  lnspection  Services",  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  #278,  Washington  DC:
The  World  Bank.
Innovation: An additional interesting feature about the inclusion of project components, project
docunents  do not appear to incorporate very many new and innovative approaches to reform
tried successfully in particular instances, Some examples: the use of receipts lotteries to enhance
VAT compliance; privatized audit review or customs (second) inspection; performance linked
bonuses; self-targeting in performance evaluation; joint returns for income and social security
contributions; performance linked administration budgets. Perhaps the only major innovation
seen in certain Bank projects is the creation of independent revenue authorities with discretion
over resource induction and deployment. Adoption of more successful innovations holds out the
potential to add significant value to Bank assistance but requires greater design effort.
Sequencing. The availability of information of sequencing of project activities in projects varies
greatly. Several projects provide no info:urmation  on project sequencing. Indeed, in one response
to questionnaire's administered to task mnanagers  as part of this review, for a project which did
not have a  project  implementation plan, the respondent states that  "There was an  implicit
sequence..." but "No plan was made to go about this implicit sequencing, and, therefore, after
the first purchase of computers to "solve all problems" the project came to a stop for about two
years" (italics in original). Other projects provide detailed timelines for different project activities
with or without a discussion of the rationale for the sequencing adopted (Box 5). However, as
there  is  no  unifornity  of  sequencing across projects  and,  as  yet,  limited  information on
14completed projects, no useful inferences can be drawn about the appropriate sequencing of
activities in administration reform projects.
Box  6. Implementation  Plan for VAT Introduction
Mongolia Fiscal TechnicalAssistance Project, 19981
The  introduction  of a VAT  in Mongolia  is part  of a major  tax reform  program  of base broadening  and rate
lowering.  Key requirements  for successful  VAT  implementation  have  been  identified  as: (a) a sound  tax
administration  and (b) well-informed  taxpayers  that know  how  to apply  the new law.
To implement  the reform.  (a) a VAT  management  committee  has been  set up headed  by the Director
General  of the General  Tax  Department  (GDNT).  (b) An interagency  working  group  has been  created  for
day-to-day  project  implementation  with staff from  the Ministry  of Finance  (MOF),  the GDNT  and the
Customs  General  Administrationi  (CGA).  (e) Implementation  is to be supported  by an IMF-supervised
lonig  tenn VAT  advisor.
I The  project  became  effective  in September  1998.  Impleme-ntation  started  in March 1998.  and will
continue  until  March  2001.  The  detailed  implementation  plan has  eight phases  with a detailed  plan  of
action  having  been  prepared  for  each phase.  The project  has a detailed  timeline  and specifies
implementation  responsibilities  for each  component.  The phases  are:
I  . Legislation  and  PublicAcceptance."  To draft  and  pass  a VAT  Law  through  Parliament  and start  a
public  education  program:  MAOF  and GDNT.
2.  Policy  Interpretat  ons:  To develop  interpretations  of each provision,  initiating  contact  with industry
sectors  on those  issues  and establishing  a permanent  policy interpretations  unit  in headquarters:
GDNT.
3.  Registration:  To develop  registration  forms  and procedures,  a strategy  for identifying  potential
taxpayers  and training  for inspectors:  GDNT.
4.  Tax  Accounting:-  The  design,  reporting  procedures,  control,  and information  required  on VAT
returns:  GDiNT.
!5  Taxpayer  information:  GDNT.
l6.  "Importationst. To plan on how  to deal with VAT  on imports,  the development  of procedures  for
temporary  imports,  instructions  to importers  and information  and procedures  for  Customs  staff:  CGA
and GDNT.
7.  Refimds:  To plan  a general  approach  for refunds  and information  required  in the VAT  return  as well
as establish  procedures  witlh  the Treasury  Department  regarding  payment  of refunds:  GODNT  and
MOF.
8.  Training:  A detailed  plan  speci6'ing  how  and when  trainirng  for the different  components  should  be
delivered:  GDNT.
Provided  implementation  of this plan is not inflexible,  the  careful  plan.  detailed  timetable  and clear
specification  of responsibilities  increase  the probability  of success  of the project.  Comparable
implementation  plans,  which typically  fiII  within  the ambit  of Project  Implementation  Plan  (PIP)
documents  along  with detailed  cost estimates  of project  components  are available  in only S or 6 other
technical  assistance  projects  in the sample.
lMongolia, Fiscal  Technical  Assistance  Project,  March  16,  1998.  Project  ID:  MN-PE-5  1855
An interesting case study of sequencing of administrative reforms across  loan  operations  in a
sequence of three Structural Adjustment Credits (SACs) to Uganda (Box 7). Starting with high
15level institutional reform within tax administration, subsequent operations addressed selected tax
functions followed by taxpayer service quality. Unfortunately, the available assessment of the
success of this sequencing, though positive, is apparently flawed.
Box  7: Sequencing  Institutional  Reforms  In Tax Administration:  SACs  in Ugandal
Institutional  reform  and capacity  building  are, at the very least,  medium  term  endeavours  requiring
carefui  sequencingz  There  is, however,  limited  theoretical  guidance  about  the appropriate  sequencing  of
institutional  and capacity  building  reforms  in the area  of tax administration.  An evaluation  of the
sequencing  and selection  of tax administration  reforms  over 3 structural  adjustment  credits  (SACs)  and
the Second  Economic  Recovery  Credit  (ERC  II) in Uganda,  spanning  a 10  year period  (1990-1999),
could,  therefo  provide  valuable  insights.
Tax  and administrative  reforms  undertaken  in the three SACs  were:
*  Second  Economic  Recovery  Credit  (EJC II), 1990,  and SAC : Major reforms:  Establishing  the
Uganda  Revenue  Authority  (URA),  reducing  exemptions  and the threshold  of the income  tax.
Other  reforms-  Capacity  and procedural  reform  to strengthen  auditing,  investigation,  data and records
management,  monitoring  systems,  tax collection  ; increased  penalties  for tax collection;  improved
training  programss;  excise  and sales tax rate reformn.
*  SAC  IT Major reforms: Taxpayer identification  numbering;  further  curtailment  of tax exemptions;
move  to a VAT  in the medium  term.
*  SAC III: Major  reforms:  Establishing  an independent  dispute  resolution  mechanism  for tax
grievances;  improving  tax policy  analysis  capacity  in the Ministry  of Finance;  Further  measures  to
eliminate  income  tax and VAT  exemptions.
Other  reforms:  Reformulating  the role and increased  independence  for the URA;  Strengthening
performance  monitoring  in the URA;  measures  to enhance  public  perception  of the integrity  of URA
Board  members;  reforming  anti-corruption  procedures.
Parallel  reforms  of public  expenditure  management,  the civil service  and the regulatory  framework  for
the  private sector  were  undertaken  in all three SACs. 2 Among  its actions,  the URA  effected  significant
personnel  changes  and raised  staff salaries  beyond  civil service  norms.  There  was also substantial
induction  of capital  equipment  financed  by other  donors.
Both  SAC I and II were  rated as having  satisfactory  outcomes  that were likely  to be sustained  (ERC I1
was  rated  as marginally  unsatisfactory  primarily  doe  to limited  success  in civil service  and parastatal
reform),  though  institutional  development  was  rated as moderate.  The  Proposal  to the Managing  Director
of IDA for SAC  III reports  that "The  reforn of tax administration  in Uganda  is widely  regarded  as highly
successful"  but goes on to report  that the  tax-GDP  ratio  is virtually  the only performance  measure  on
which  this  judgement  is based,  and points  out that this is a "misleading  indicator"  on which  to judge tax
administration  performanee.  It points  to several  shortcomings,  which  fonn the basis  of areas  to be
reformed  under SAC  III. A detailed,  well  designed,  review  at the time of closure  of SAC  III could,
therefore,  prove  valuable.
Uganda  Second  Economic  Recovery  Credit,  January  8, 1990,  Project  ID  UG-PE-2949.
Uganda  Structural  Adjustment  Credit  I, November  1, 1991,  Project  ID  UG-PE-2947.
Uganda  Structural  AdjustmentCredit  IL  April  i8, 1994,  Project  ID  UG-PE-2967.
Uganda  Structural  Adjustment  Credit  III, May 1, 1997,  Project  ID  UG-PE-2987.
2 SAC  III  also  had  a reform  component  for sub-national  taxes,  while all  three SACs  had  trade  tax and  customs
reform  components.  These  are not discussed  here.
16Coordination and  implementation planning:  Table  8  presents information on  discussion in
project documents on the relation of projects with other Bank projects and with other agencies.
Again the criterion used for the Table is existence of such discussion with no judgement being
made as to its adequacy. If SAR/MOP discussion of coordination is taken at face value,  then
such coordination was adequate in the majority of projects where it is present. In fact, for one
project, the ICR highlighted the inadequate coordination between the project and other donor
financed and Bank projects as an important cause of its unsatisfactory outcome. An interesting
feature documented in Table 8 is the relatively low incidence of coordination with the IMF in
TLSR projects. Further examination of the causes and impact of this lack of coordination could
prove useful. A final feature worth noting is the prevalence of dedicated client project teams and
the relatively intensive use of consultants in TLSR project design.
Table  8. Other  Design  Features
43 projects  with  a major  administration  component
(% of projects)
Type  of Project  SAR/MOP  SAR/MOP  Coordination  Projects  with  Projects  with
Discussion  of  Discussion  of  with  IMF  Dedicated  Client  One  or More
Relation  with  Coordination  with  Country  Project  Components
other  Bank  Other  Agencies/  Management/  Implemented  by
Projects  Projects  (including  Monitoring  Consultants
IhF)  Units
TALs,  LILs,  66.7  81.8  45.5  90.9  68.2
SILs,  RILs
SALs and  85.7  100  95.2  19.0  26.3*
SECALs
All Projects  76.2  90.7  69.7  55.8  48.8*
Notes:  Details  of 2 projects  are not available.
6. How To Gauge Success: Performance  Indicators
After  discussion  the  rationale  and  design  ofperformance  indicators,  their  limited  use and the lack  of
uniformity  across  projects  is documented  here.
The nature and content ofperformance indicators: A distinction can be made between indicators
to judge the performance of a tax system as a whole, a tax or customs administration, and a
reformn  project. A country should, in principle, be interested in the performance of its tax system
as a whole and, within this, the tax and customs administrations. Thus, pre-project diagnostic
work should use the same set of indicators as those needed to measure tax system performance.
On the other hand, for project implementation such indicators are insufficient and, when there is
a time lag between reforms and their impact, of little evaluative use during project execution.
Besides outcome indicators, a system of PI for a project should therefore include input, process
and  output indicators."'  In  all  cases, benchmarks  or  guidance  at  interpreting performance
indicators are needed to make interpretation feasible:
*  For outcome indicators - cross-country, previous year, or targeted performance  benchmarks.
*  For input indicators - quantity, timeliness (e.g. agreed dates), cost, and, if possible, quality
benchmarks.
A detailed  discussion  is in World  Bank,  Operations  Policy  Department  (1996).
17*  For process indicators - coverage, duration and cost benckmarks.
*  For output indicators - time, quantity and, where possible, quality benchmarks.
PIs are, by definition, "quantitative  indicators for use in  the management, or assessing the
performance, of an agency, program or activity".2 While outcome PIs and PIs to judge quality
are difficult to devise and  while congruence between PIs an-d objectives may not  be easily
ascertained (Box 7), other PIs for inputs, processes and outputs are not difficult to devise or are
already  available.  The  World  Bank,  Operations Poiicy  Department (1996)  provides  data
pertaining to the use of Pls in TALs during 1993-1995 and points out that 39 out of 70 TALs
were "Projects with comprehensive matrix, including PIs and quantitative measures" while 11
projects had  no PIs.  As  pointed out  earlier, Datta-Mitra  (1997) identifies the  absence of
perfonnance indicators as a major weakness in the design of tax administration components in
SALs/SECALs.
Box 7: Non-congruence  Between  Pls and Objectives. Enforcement  Collections
One indicator  of administration  effectiveness,  present  in some  projects  in the sample  is the amount  of
enforcement  collections  or its ratio  to total colections.  Enforcement  collections  are  collections  of tax and,
possibly,  penalties  and fines due to the efforts  of the  administration  and exclude  taxes  paid  voluntarily  or
t'compliance  collections".  Yet some refiection  shows  that an increase  in the value  of this indicator,  in
level  or in ratio form,  does not always  indicalte  improved  effectiveness.  If the effectiveness  of an
ineffective  administration  increases,  it is of course  likely  that enforcement  collections  will  increase.  But
excluding  genuine  mistakes?  taxpayers  will  truithfully  report  their taxes  due if the administration  is very
effective  to ensure  that they  are not subjected  to penalties  or fines.  So any increase  in the effectiveness  of
an already  effective  admninistration  should  result  in adecrease  in enforcement  collections.  Low
enforcement  collections  could,  therefore,  indicate  either  a very ineffective  or a very effective
administration.
PIs in the sam;ple.  Annex Table A2 lists performnance  indicators used in the 12 TLSRs and 5
SALs/SECALs  where perfornance  indicators (other than compliance with covenants and the
tax/GDP ratio) were specified. In addition, 1 SAC had a condition that the governnent  would
develop a set of performance indicators cdunng  the project. The table shows that performance
indicators specified in  TLSRs were considerably more detailed than those in SALs/SECALs.
Nevertheless, even  among TLSRs,  corrlprehensiveness varies and  indicators specified  lack
uniformity across projects. There is also significant use of  qualitative information in lieu of
performance indicators. Judging from the table, the design weakness identified by Datta-Mitra
(1997) in  SALs/SECALs is only somewhat lower in TLSR loans. A case in which there  is
dramatic variation in the quality of "PIs", f.or  customs and tax reform components, even in within
the same project, is in Box 8. Box 8 also gives details of a tax administration reform project,
where the set of PIs is relatively comprehensive  even if some of them are "qualitative  PIs".
2 World  Bank,  Operations  Policy  Department  (1996).
18Box  8. Performance  Indicators: Public  Financial Management  Projects in Turkeyl and Colombia 2
The  sharp  contrast  between  the detailed  set of performance  indicators  for the customs  administration  and
the  tax administration  components  of the 1995  Public  Financial  Management  Project  (PPMP)  for Turkey
is instructive.
For  customs  administration,  indicators  are all base-lined  with  respect  to pre-reform  benchmarks,  and
accompanied  by a detailed  description  of the intended  results.  The  project  also lists methods  to be used in
order to determine  if the intended  results  are achieved.  In most cases  this involves  a survey  prior  to and
after reform.  For example,  the objective  of improving  service  by reducing  the physical  inspection  rate for
shipments  of imports  and exports,  was L00  percent  before  reforms  and targeted  to be reduced  to no more
than 20 percent  of imports  and 1-2  percent  of exports  by the end of the project.  Indicators  for the tax
administration  component  on the other  hand,  are simply  a list of the various  project  components  and at
what  point in time they  will be launched.
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19Colombia:  By way  of contrast,  the performance  indicator  matrix  specified  in the Colombia  PFMP  is
specified  to include  activity-wise  indicatoTs,  an assessment  of the pre-project  situation  and a clearly
specified  end of proect outcome.  The  matrix  has the following  column  heads.
For tax administration,  indicators  (summarized  in Annex  Table  Al) are specified  for:
Operational subsystem  s
1.  Taxpayer  services  (reduced  compliance  cost based  on surveys  before  and after the  project).
2.  "Fiscalization'  (2 quantitative  targ-ets  for revenue  and evasiow;  one qualitative  indicator).
3.  Compliance  collection  (I qualitative,  I quantitative).
4.  Enforcement  collection  (I qualitative,  I quantitative  - revenue  target).
Administrative  subsystems
S.  Inventories  of goods  (3 qualitative).
6.  Financial  management  (I qualitative).
7.  Personnel  management  (I qualitative).
8.  Office  management  (1 qualitative).
9.  Informatics  management  0(qualitative).
Control subsystems
10.  Performance and interal  audit (1 qualitatiive).
II1.  Fiscal analysis and studies (I qualitative).
This set of performnance  indicators can be tightened, particularly where only qualitative indicators are
specified and  fade more comprehensive so as to apply to administration as  a whole and not merely to
components covered in the proect.  However, the careful benchmnarking,  identification of dates and
implernentation  responsibility and parsimony are key strengths.
'Turkey,  Public  Financial  Management  Project,  August  29, 1995.  Project  ID:  TR-PA-35759.
1  Colombia,  Public  Financial  Management  Project October  21, 1993.  Project  ID: COePE-6889
7.  Evaluation of Project  Appraisal Metrhodology  in the Sample
A general  discussion  of diferent  aspects  qf quantitative  examination  of net project  benefits  and
risks  is first  undertaken.  Appraisal  of benefit  assessment  and risk appraisal  in different projects
is next described and assessed
20Formal evaluation of expected project returns: The overall objective of a tax administration or
customs reform project must ultimately be to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the
administration. No operational method to evaluate effectiveness benefits has, to our knowledge,
been devised." 3 Under the assumption that tax administration improvements  have limited effects
on the rest of the economy (i.e., that the project is "small") and that revenues will remain below
potential despite reforms, revenue increases due to the project can be evaluated at the incremental
shadow value (or premium) of additional transfers from the private to the public sector. For
customs control, other, non revenue, effectiveness indicators may be needed depending on the
circumstances.  Efficiency refers to real resources used in collecting revenues, per unit of revenue
collected. Put another way it is the difference between the decrease in private sector resources per
unit increase in the net revenue of the government. The difference between the two includes
collection costs  of the  government and  compliance costs  of taxpayers. To  the  extent that
horizontal and vertical equity of tax collection is important, shadow valuation of the cost to
different taxpayer  groups is  needed. Leaving aside  distributional considerations, efficiency
benefits, unlike revenue increases, can be evaluated at their dollar value. While no method to
evaluate  administrative  efficiency  has  been  discussed  in  the  literature  either,  deriving
approximate indicators of efficiency for use in project appraisal is feasible. No project in the
sample has tried to formally assess benefits  from administrative improvement in terms of benefits
from improved effectiveness  and efficiency ofadministration.  14
A  number  of  projects  carried  out  formal assessments  of  expected  "economic returns"  or
"financial returns" from projects. Financial returns  to  projects were  usually inappropriately
judged in terms of additional (real or nominal) tax or customs revenues or increases in the tax to
GDP  ratio  that  would  accrue  to  the  government  from  reforms  under  the  project.  More
surprisingly, most projects fail to even examine direct administrative costs. The conclusion of
this review is that formal project appraisal of net projects benefits has been inadequate in every
case where it was undertaken. That such analysis, even detailed and careful analysis, can be
potentially misleading is the subject of the case study in Box 9.
On the  other hand,  a desirable feature found in  4 TSLR projects (for Bulgaria, Colombia,
Hungary and Latvia) is the evaluation of alternative project designs. Aside from these projects,
most projects failed to formally specify alternative designs for appraisal.
Risk assessment: Here the identification of sources of risk and uncertainty and translation of this
into changes in the benefit/cost stream of the project can be expected. Risks that arise are of three
types: Inaccurate or uncertain project costs or benefits even if project activities are carried out
adequately and assumptions about exogenous factors are borne out;  failure to complete project
activities; and  exogenous risks. For  quantifiable risks  this  implies  the need  for  sensitivity
analysis of the original project cash flows.
In Table 10 the incidence of formal project appraisal in the sample is reviewed though it bears
repetition that appraisal methods are inadequate.
13 The  Marginal  Effective  Cost  of Funds  methodology  of Slemrod  and  Yitzhaki  (1997)  provides  a framework  which
can  be adapted  to do this,  but as yet only  in principle.
4 Discussion  addressing  the same  issue  is to be found  in McMahon  (1997).
21Table 10.  Methods  Employed  in Appraisal  of Net Project  Benefits
(43  projects  withi  a major  administration  component)
(% of projects)
Heuristic  Social/Economic Financial  Heuristic  Quantitative
appraisal  Returns  returns  Risk  Risk
assessment  Assessment
TALs,  LILs, SILs,  RILs  lO0  _  8  28.6  100  14.3
SALs and SECALs  100  )  __  _  0  100  0
All Projects  100  2.4  14.3  1100  7.1
Notes:  1.  Details  are not available  for one  project.
2. For 2 projects  revenue  impact  was estimated.
Box  9. Cost  Benefit  Analysis
The Philippines nax  Computerization  projecL,  19933
The Philippines' Tax Computerization project is one of 7 projects  in the sample with a formal analysis of
net project  benefits  (others  include  technical  assistance  loans  to Argentina,  Bulgaria,  Guatemala,  Latvia,
Mongolia  and Thailand,  though  the methods  of analysis  are  not uniform).  Compared  to other  proects the
analysis  is detailed  in the Staff  Appraisal  Report  (SAR).  Furthermore,  estimates  of additional  tax
collection  are based  on tax by tax evasion  estimates  made  in three  different  studies. 2
The  project's  net financial  benefits  are calculated  based  on year  by year  (estimated)  project  expenses  and
year by year (estimated) incremental revenue collection due to the project. The source of incremental
revenues  is reduced  evasion  alone,  the reduction  in evasion  being  assumed  to be to 40%/o  of the initial
level,  translating  to an increase  in the tax-GDP  ratio from  the existing  15.5%  to 19%K  by 2001.  The  project
duration  is 1993-97  but cash flows  for the period  1993-2001  are considered  for net benefit  calculations.
Project  costs  after 1997 are assumed  to be a constant  (real)  amount  per year. Total  tax collection  in 1992
is estimated  at 209 billion  pesos  and total tax;  evasion  at that point  was  estimated  at 80 billion  pesos.  The
project  also assumed  that tax collection  would  increase  gradually  over a period  of up to 7 years.  Given  an
estimated  growth  rate of GDP,  incremental  collection  and net benefits  were  calculated  year  by year using
three  possible  scenarios:
1. Benefits  are achieved  gradually  during  years  293
2. Benefits  are zero  in the first 4 years and  then achieved  gradually  during  years 5-9.
3. Benefits  are achieved  gradually  during  yea  rs2-54
Annual  discount  rates  between  10%  and 20% were used,  without  any comment,  to discount  future  net
benefits.  The  range  of discounted  present  values  for these  calculations  was 59 to 225 million  pesos  and
the (discounted  present  value)  benefit  to (discounted  present  value)  benefit-cost  ratio  ranged  from 42 to
I  110 million  pesos.  The internal  financial  rate of return  (IFFR)  was between  203%  and 300%.
The  assessment  pointed  out that intangible  beinefits  include  lower  future  manpower  requirements  even  if
there  was  rapid  growth  in the number  of taxpayers,  and greater  taxpayer  and staff satisfaction.  The
assessment  also claimed  that an economic  rate of return  was "impossible  to estimate"  since  the main
effect  of the  project  was the  transfer  of additional  resources  from  the private  to the public  sector.  Jt also
noted-that  additional  collections  were likely  to be forthcoming  from identified  non-filers,  even  after the
projectfs  useful  life  was over.
Evaluation:  Taken  on its own  terms,  the assumed  real growth  rate of GDP  during 1994-2001  (7% per
year)  was  overly  optimistic  given  the  4.5% rate actually  achieved  during 1992-97,  according  to World
bank data).  The assumption  that tax evasion  would  fall to 40% of its initial  level  appears  similarly
optimistic,  especially  since  the project  design  does  not explicitly  address  corruption  of tax officials,
22which  available  evidence  suggests  is substantial  (the  Transparency  International  1998  Perceptions  Index
ranked  the Philippines  at 55 out of 85 countries,  where  rank I is the least  corrupt  country)5  In fact,  till
1997  the highest  tax-GDP  ratio  achieved  (which  was in 1997  itself)  was 16.8%,  making  the achievement
of a 19%  tax  effort  by 2001  open  to question.  Though  the SAR  recognized  that increased  revenues  are
transfers  from the  private sector  no attempt  to take  this into  account  in calculations  was  made. One  way
around  the  problem  of estimating  the (shadow)  premium  parameter  of private  to public  transfers  is to find
the break  even social  premium  as illustrated  below.  On the  other  hand,  certain  other  assumptions  are
pessimistic.  The increase  in administration  costs  (in this case  taken  as equal  to project  outlays),  which
translates  directly  (absent  distributional  effects)  into  an added  social  burden,  are overestimated.  As the
previous  paragraph  reports,  reduced taxpayer  compliance  costs  as well as reduced  current  and future
administrative  costs  would  have  been  likely,  offsetting  some  of the direct  administrative  expenditure
increase.
As it stands,  the projecs net benefit  are  probably  positive  (though  lower  than the SAR  suggests)  even  if
some  of the over-optimism  is corrected.  For  example,  if (a) actual  tax GDP  ratios  are used up  to 1997  and
projected  to increase  thereafter  at the average  increase  during  1995-  1997  (2.4%),  (b) if additional
revenues  due  to the  project  were only 50%  of the growth  achieved  (the  rest being  attributable  to other
reforms  such  as the  recent VAT  refonn), (c) no downward  adjustment  is made  to costs,  and (d) the
discount  rate is taken  to be as high as 20%,  the project  breaks  even  provided  the premium  of each
additional  dollar  transferred  to the public  sector  is 0.05  pesos  (a 5% premium).  At a 10%  premium,  the
net present  value  of the project  ranges  from 1.5  billion  to 3 billion  pesos  (and benefit-cost  ratios  between
3 and  4.2, IRR  of 50.3%/o)  for  the 10%  to 20%  range  of discount  rates  in the SAR.
i However,  project  net benefits  could  easily  turn negative  despite  revenue  increases,  if additional  transfers
to the government  have  a lower  premium,  which  could  arise  if, say, further  public  sector  expansion  had
limited  benefits  so that, instead  of increasing  revenue,  downsizing  government  was needed. On  the other
hand, if substantial  cost saving  were to be made  possible  by a revenue  neutral  project,  net benefits  would
be expected  to be positive.
'Philippines  Tax  Computerization,  May,  1993,  Project  ID. PH-P&4599.
UNDP  (1992),  Venecia  (1992)  and  Manasan  (1988)  - full eitations  are not given in  the SAR
I The  cash  flow  was taken  over  9 years  rather  than  the 10  years  claimed  in  the SAR.
4 The numerical  counterpart  of "gradually"  is not reported  in  the SAR
5 Infact, the tax GDP  ratio  averaged  16.4%  during  1993-  1997,  reaching  17%  in 1997.  This  implies  that  the
incremental  effort in 1997  was about  20% lower  than  assumed  in the appraisal.
9.  Evaluation Of Project Outcomes
The evaluation of project outcomes and impact in post-project documents is documented here.
This is followed by an assessment of the basis of assessment of project outcomes and the extent
to which lessons  for future operations are derived  The section closes with a discussion and an
example of  a possible  strategy  to  increase the value  of post-project  evaluation for future
operations.
As discussed earlier, only a handful of the projects examined in this review have closed and have
undergone  outcome  evaluation.  Boxes  10 and  11 respectively  present  case  studies  of a highly
satisfactory and a highly unsatisfactory project.
23Box 10: Computers and More: Thie  Second Public Sector Management Project, Chile 1
Chile's  Second  Public  Sector Management Project, commencing in 1991,  was highly  successful
according  to the end of project  evaluation  by the OED  The  project  outcome  (achievement  of
objectives),  borrower  and Bank  performance  were  rated  as highly  satisfactory,  institutional  development
as substantial  and sustainability  of achievenments  as likely.  In addition,  the client-oriented  public  sector
management  vision  of the Chilean  govemment  described  in the loan  document,  the relatively  low
incidence  of corruption 3 in and high institutional  quality  (Evans  and Battaile,  1998)  should  also be noted.
Thus,  all 4 key project  success  factors  identified  by Evans  and Battaile  (1998)  as also high institutional
quality  were present  in PSM IL.  A questionnaire  response  from  a member  of the initial  appraisal  mission,
adds  that ownership  of the project  by managerial  and technical  staff was  a key success  factor.  Regarding
the outcome  itself,  the respondent  adds: "C:hile  has the  best tax administration  in LAC and also perhaps  in
the developing  world.  It is probably  on the level  of high compliance  EU countries.  It is perhaps  the most
cost-effective  administration  in the world.  T'he  project  helped  Chile  to further  develop  this path  with a
clear improvement  of taxpayers  services  by the strategic  and constant  use  of IT tools for an interactive  tax
administration."
The  project  itself,  was  unabashedly  a computerization  project especially  the tax administration
component.  Other  sectors  (customs,  treasury,  social  security,  treasury,  policy  analysis  and legislature)
also had dominant  computerization  components  but all sectors  had accompanying  components  dealing
with suc  things  as organizational  reform,  training,  skill upgrading,  strengthening  evaluation.  The
integrated design across different fiscal management activities, as opposed to a stand alone tax
administration computerization  project, can also be seen as a factor contributing to success. Furthermore,
there was a clear recognition in the project design that the primary objective was improvedinformation
management and not merely induction  of new technology. In fact the greatest hurdle faced in project
implementation occurred with the equipment supply - the replicability across regions of software
acquired through the project proved infeasible (according to the questionnaire  respondent) but this was
overcome  via flexible  management  problem  solving.
'Chile, Second  Public  Sector  Management  Project (PSM  11),  September  11, 1991.  Project  ID: CL-PE-6669.
2 OED  ICR  Review  -Evaluation  Summary,  1998..
A questionnaire  response  from a member  of the initial  appraisal  mission,  however,  reports  that  project
implementation  was not free  of corruption.
Box 11: Computers and Poor Supervision: Tax Computerization, Thailandl
In 1992  the Government  of Thailand  introduced  a major  tax reform  and requested  Bank  assistance  to
I finance an overhauling of its existing computer system. Its main objective was to establish a modern and
decentralized  tax administration  system  through  the provision  of appropriate  hardware,  software  and
technical assistance. At the time of Board approval (FYI991) this was the largest stand alone computer
project  ever  supported  by the Bank  and also the largest  integrated  computer  system  in Thailand.
However,  at the closing  date in December  1996  the loan  had failed completely  and was rated  as highly
unsatisfactory.  No comprehensive  data base  rnanagement  and processing  system  had been  established  and
most of the applications  software  had not beern  delivered.
The Implementation  Completion  Report  lists  the following  as the main reasons  for its failure:
f  Lack of strategic analysis:
24|  Poor  project  preparation:  Technical  requirements  listed  in the bidding  document  were not based  on a
description  of the ehanges  in the Revenue  Department's  business  processes  that were to be supported
by computerization.
*  The  project  objectives  were narrowly  focused  on the computer  system  and not specific  enough.  For
example it only listed a few services that were to be provided by the new system.
*  The  project  lacked  performance  benchmarks.
Weak  project  implementation  and supervision:
*  There  was  no detailed  project  implementation  plan.  The  action plan  listed  the  main project
milestones,  but gave  no indication  of how  they  were  to be achieved.  The action  plan did not show the
relationships  and priorities  between  the various  actions  and tasks and who was  responsible  for them.
Dates  for the  delivery  of various  outputs  were  repeatedly  changed  during  supervision  of the project.
I  The  lack  of detailed  implementation  plan  made  supervision  difficult.  Until  January 1996,  the project
was  rated  satisfactory  even  though  it had run into problems  at an early stage  of implementation.
Inadequate  technical  specifications
*  The system  specifications  included  in the Invitation  For Bids  (IFB)  were  for the hardware,  and not
specific  enough  for the applications  software  component  of the project.
*  In 1993  the software  contractor  abandoned  work  without  having  delivered  the software  applications
in accordance  with  the contat.  Furthermore,  the computer  hardware  that had already  been  delivered
was of insufficient  capacity  and required  replacing.
lpoor  prcureme  rocess:
i *  TMere  was  no real bidding  process  for the turn-key  contract.  The  Revenue  Department  wanted  the
software  quickly,  so instead  of a two stage  bidding  process 2 software  was  provided  through  a two-
envelope  process.
Weaknesses  in project  management
*  Despite  an in-depth  review  by the Bank  in January  1996  not much  progress  had been  made  by
December  1996,  the closing  date  of the project,  and the Bank  decided  not to grant  an extension  of the
loan.
I Thailand,  Tax  Computerization  Projec January,  199  1, TH-PE-4774.
2Under  a two  stage  biding  process,  unpriced  technical  proposals  on the basis  of a conceptual  design  or performance
specifications  are first invited,  subject  to technical  as well  as commercial  clarifications  and amendments.  Theses  are
followed  by amended  bidding  documents  and  the submission  of final  technical  proposals  and  priced  bids in  the
second  stage.  As opposed  to two-stage  bidding,  in  the two-envelope  system,  bidders  are required  to submit  separate
qualification,  technical  and  price  proposals  at the  same  time, but  which  are opened  sequentially  in separate  sessions
and  evaluated.  The  Bank  no longer  accepts  the two  envelope  system.
Computerization:  Adequacy and Sequencing
The computerization  question:  Two important  questions  with regard to IT are its role in good  tax
administration and the  process of IT  induction. Its  role  and the  appropriate process of IT
induction in the  context of  countries at different levels of development and  with  different
characteristics is under-researched (for example in  an Argentina versus a  Vanuatu versus a
25Mozambique).i5  Indeed, the role of IT and the induction process are poorly understood even in
the United States, which, in the 1  960s, was a pioneer in the induction of IT in tax administration
(Box 12). The following is a partial list of hypotheses, suggested by the experiences in the
projects in Boxes 10-12 as well as others, on which reform experiences can possible shed some
light:
*  A  prerequisite for  cost-effective IT  introduction is  the  availability  of  reliable  power
infrastructure and to a lesser extent, adequate modem communications.
*  Use of IT is cost-effective for administration of the following  taxes in economies above a
(rather low) threshold size: income and corporation taxes, the VAT and sales taxes, customs
duties and asset/property taxes.
*  Cost-effectiveness of  IT  is  greatest  for  the  following functions (in  descending  order):
taxpayer  or  asset  identification and  registration,  tax  collection,  declaration  processing,
auditing or post-clearance controls, personnel management. Other functions are less cost-
effective.
*  Institutional reforms and capacity creation, particularly re-organization, legal and procedural
reforms, manpower upgrading, and performance  monitoring, should precede or be undertaken
simultaneously  with IT induction or upgrading.
v  IT is most cost-effective if the administration is functionally organized.
*  The effectiveness of a tax administration in combating  non-compliance is increased when
major functions are automated.
*  IT aids in curbing corruption in functionally organized tax administrations when major
functions are automated.
- It is cost-effective for tax administrat:ion  to promote IT induction in related sectors (e.g.
banks, exporters/importers,  company accounts).
•  It is cost-effective, given adequate  use of IT in the economy, to privatize tax collection and,
at a later stage, assessment (i.e. self-assessment  via retum preparers as against official
assessment).
- Modular introduction of IT, tax by tax and/or function by function does not impair its cost
effectiveness.
*  Pilot projects and careful involvement and education of tax department employees and
management enable the gestation period for IT introduction to be shortened.
*  A dedicated change management unit with appropriate  powers is necessary for successful IT
introduction.
Several of these hypotheses are, in principle, amenable to statistical testing.
Box 12.  How  Not  to Automate  Tax Administration?  The (US)  IRS  saga
It is not only  developing  countries  that encounter  probiems  when  trying  to implement  large  technology
investments.  The Intemal  Revenue  Senrice  (IRS)  in the US has had continuing problems  with the
implementing  its Tax Systems  Modernization  Program  (TSM).  A report  of the National  Commission  on
'  For a recent review of IT in developing and developed country tax administrations  see, for example, Das-Gupta
and Mookherjee (1998), Chapter 8. For a discussion of the process of IT induction see, for example, Clegg et. al.
(1997).
26[  Restructuring  the Internal  Revenue  Service 1 says  that:"the  IRS  has experienced  great  difficulty  in
managing  technology".
"bThe  technology  deficiencies  are an outgrowth  of management  and governance  problems  and the
agency's  inability  to pursue  a long-tenn  strategic  vision  in its business  operations.  Absent  a strategic
vision, no quantity or quality of technological modernization can be truly effective." TSM is the
centerpiece  of IRS's vision  of virtually  paperless  tax processing  to optimize  operations  and better  serve
tax payers.  Between  1986  and 1997  the Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  spent  over $3.1  billion in Tax
Systems  Modernization  (TSM),  2 and in December  1998  a technology  contract  was  given  to the
Computer  Science  Corporation  worth  an estimated  $5 billion  over its 15-year  life. 3
What  went  wrong?
A recent  report  from  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  highlights  reasons  for the failure  of the TSM
project  including-  'the IRS  did not have  a comprehensive  business  strategy  to reduce  paper  tax return
filings  in a cost effective  manner  and had not fully  put in place  the requisite  management,  software
development,  and technical  infrastructure  necessary  to successfully  implement  its ambitious  systems
modernization. They also lacked an overall systems architecture to guide the modemization's
development  and evolution.' 4 The  report  adds  that "Senior  technical  leaders  were noticeably  absent  and
the organizational  structure  with the accountability  and authority  needed  to manage  modernization  efforts
was lacking  below  the Commissioner's  office"'
How to deal with  it
The  GAO  has recommended  that the IRS (a) implements  a process  for investment  management,  (b)
implements  disciplined  procedures  for software  development;  and (c) completes  and enforces  an
integrated  systems  architecture,  including  data  and security  sub-architectures.  The  IRS has agreed  in
principle  with  their recommendations  and some progress  has also been  made  in following  the
recommendations.  For  example,  the IRS has created  an investment  review  board  to select,  control,  and
evaluate  its infornation  technology  investments.  It also provided  the first two levels  of a four-level
modernization  blueprint  to the Congress  in May, 1997.
On the other  hand  recent  developments  within  the  IRS are raising  questions  about  whether  it is actually
moving  in the right  direction.  A planned  reorganization  of the IRS  will  affect the very business  processes
and requirements  that the blueprint  is based  on, raising  questions  about  the blueprints  validity  and
applicability.  A second  issue  is the initiative  to use contractors  to modernize  the  systems  since  the IRS
has a history  of not being  able to effectively  manage  its contractors.  Finally  the IRS' Annual  Performance
Plan  explains  the modernization  efforts  in very general  terms  without  objective,  quantifiable,  and
measurable  performnance  goals  and does  not specify  measures  for assessing  progress  toward  the goals.
I  GAO  therefore  concludes  that IRS  still lacks  the ability  to etfectively  modernize  its tax systems  and  the
TSM  continues  to be classified  as a high risk project.
' A Vision For a New IRS, Report of the Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue
Service, 1997
2 Tax Systems Modermization:  Management  and Technical Weaknesses Must be Corrected if
Modernization is to succeed (Chapter Report, 07/26/95 GAO/AIMD-95-1  56).
|  Washington Post, Thursday, December 10, 1998; page BO1
4GAO/OCG-99-14  Treasury  Challenges.
2710. Main Conclusions
The main conclusions of this  review mainly relate to  design and process issues of tax and
customs administration projects rather than to their impact. This can be remedied in future work
only if better information becomes available which, however, depends on project design and
implementation  planning incorporating  measures to allow for improved impact assessment.
The maj  or limnitation  of Bank operations in the area of tax and customs administration pertains to
the inadequate institutional framework For  knowledge accumulation  from loan operations. Unlike
several other areas of operation, theoretical underpinnings for efficient and effective tax and
customs administration are still rudimentary. The quality of administration can only improve in a
sustained manner if there is accumulation  of knowledge as to what the determinants of successful
administration are. While recent theories stress the importance of institutions which  lead to
contestability and  transparency and harness voice, evidence on the efficacy of such reforms in
the specific context of tax administration is still lacking. Furthermore, these features only pertain
to a part of the array of potential determinants of tax administration perfonnance identified in
existing work.
Other major conclusions are:
1.  Pre-project diagnosis and project design could be improved in most projects particularly in
examining environmental,  accountability, cost  of  administration, managerial  autonomy,
performance incentives for staff and taxpayer equity and services, and pre-project work could
draw more systematically on lessons from previous experience.
2.  In particular, institutional components in project design were biased towards organization,
IT-related procedures and manpower upgrading, with insufficient attention to accountability
and anti-corruption institution building and cost-effectiveness  of administration.
3.  There are a short list of projects which, despite sharing some of these problems, can serve as
guides to good practice.
4.  While no overall conclusion can be drawn about project sequencing nor about coordination
across projects, instances of poor sequencing and coordination, as reported in ICRs, exist.
5.  Projects made  inadequate use  of  performance indicators of  different  kinds. Comparing
indicators in projects where these were present, reveals a lack of uniformity in their choice.
6.  Project appraisal methods were seldom used and when used were inadequate.
7.  Methods used for evaluation of project outcomes are possibly capable of improvement and
greater uniformity.
This  review has  the  benefit  of  hindsight. Most  projects in  the  sample predate  the  recent
recognition of the importance of institutions and performance assessment in the Bank and so
almost inevitably fail to meet standards set in the review. Indeed, the Latvia best practice project,
which passes most tests in this review, dates from 1998.
11. Suggestions For Future Bank Operations
Background work is essential to improve .Bank  assistance for revenue administration. A strategy
needs to  be  articulated for  the  Bank, incorporating current perceptions  of  a  best  practice
28framnework  for tax and customs administration and their reform process. The nature of Bank
involvement should also be clarified. For exarnple, one promising line of action, that has been
suggested is for the Bank to support and strengthen regional associations of tax administrations
which can act as catalysts of change. A second, may be to partner and support private sector
consultancy organizations  to enable them to manage major components of administrative  reform.
A third area of action is to formally institutionalize the knowledge accumulation process, an area
which is particularly important in fields like tax administration. This will also have implications
for the skill mix of staff and, therefore, staff recruitment and training plans. Regarding specific
areas, a number of recommnendations  are suggested by the analysis in this review.
Diagnosis
1.  Pre-project diagnostic work should be based on a comprehensive framework, which pays
sufficient attention to institutions in addition to  traditional concerns of tax administrators.
Ideally, a single but flexible framework should be adopted throughout the Bank.
2.  Diagnostic  performance measurement  should  be  done,  where  possible,  quantitatively
according to standard indicators and against preferably cross-country benchmarks.
3.  Pre-project work should also include a review of (or a citation of) the key determinants of
good administration and project implementation.
Design
4.  Project design should be  based on a  strategic vision of the administration, pay adequate
attention to good governance but should, nevertheless be limited in scope given a country's
implementation capacity. Alternative designs and sequencing should be analyzed and their
rationale provided.
5.  To generate long-term lessons, projects should specify hypotheses being tested.
Performance indicators
6.  A standard set of outcome performance (effectiveness, efficiency, accountability) indicators
for tax and customs administrators  should be specified, to be drawn on for all projects. 16
7.  Diagnostic work should give rise to pre-project base values of performance indicators for
outcome assessment.
8.  Outcome performance indicators for projects should not only permit project performance to
be tracked, but should be chosen to permit hypotheses to be evaluated.
9.  The use  of  taxpayer  surveys should be  an  integral part  of  both  diagnostic  work and
performance  appraisal if not precluded by cost considerations.
10. Standard  guidelines for quantitative input, process and output indicators should be laid down
and mandated.
1
6 A set of performance  indicators  is being developed  by the Tax  Policy  and  Administration  Thematic  Group.  A
preliminary  version  has already  been  field  tested.  Similar  work  is also  being  done at the Inter-American
Development  Bank,  the IMF  and the OECD.
29Appraisal
It.  A  standard, quantitative, appraisal  framework or  tool  needs  to  be  developed  for  tax
administration projects. If possible, this should be linked to an economic impact assessment
model such as the 1-2-3 model developed by DEC should be incorporated in this tool.
12. The tool should be designed to allow for risk assessment and sensitivity to key parameters
like shadow values.
Post-project Evaluation
13. The use of performance indicators specified in the project is essential if the evaluation is to
have comparability  across projects.
14. The assignment of outcome, sustainability, institutional development and Bank/borrower
performance rankings should, as far  as possible, be  based on the  quantitative indicators
specified.
15. To facilitate the knowledge gathering and hypothesis testing role of projects (lessons learned)
greater involvement of academic consultants could be desirable in diagnostic, design and
evaluation phases.
30Apppendix: Detailed Tables
Table Al. Inclusion in Diagnosis of Tax Structure Analysis
(43 projects with a major administration component)
(% of projects)
TALs, LILs, SILs, RILs  SALs and SECALs
Major Taxes in Country  78.9  Tax to GDP ratio  100.0
Tax to GDP ratio  75.0  Major Taxes in Country  95.2
Recent Reform History: rates  63.6  Recent Reform History: base and  90.0
exemptions
Nature of Exemptions  61.1  Nature of Exemptions  85.7
Tax shares  58.8  Recent Reform History: rates  85.0
Rates  57.9  Base indicators  76.2
Base indicators  52.6  Tax shares  66.7
Other Analysis  47.4  Rates  66.7
Recent Reform History: base  45.5  Other Analysis  66.7
and exemptions
Effective Rates  15.8  Buoyancies/ Elasticities  28.6
Other Formal Analysis  15.8  Effective Rates  23.8
Buoyancies/ Elasticities  11.8  Other Formal Analysis  10.0
Tax to base ratio: other  10.5  Tax to base ratio: other  9.5
Notes: 1. Projects are included if they examine an area, however sketchily and whether qualitatively  or
quantitatively.
2. Projects where the diagnosis category is not relevant are excluded from the denominator in calculating
percentages.
Table A2. Inclusion in Diagnosis of Effectiveness Indicators and Analysis
(43 projects with a major administration component)
(%/  of  projects)
TALs, LILs, SILs, RILs  SALs and SECALs
Number of taxpayers  52.4  International comparison  38.1
Taxpayer service  38.1  Corruption  23.8
Tax Gap: Specific activities  33.3  Number of taxpayers  19.0
Overall Tax gap  25.0  Tax gap: specific taxes  14.3
International comparison  25.0  Overall Tax gap  9.5
Corruption  22.7  Tax Gap: Specific activities  9.5
Tax gap: specific  taxes  20.0  Taxpayer service  9.5
Note: See the notes to Table 4.3.
Table A3. Inclusion in Diagnosis of Efficiency Indicators and Analysis
(43 projects with a major administration component)
(%  of projects)
TALs, LILs,  SALs and
SILs, RILs  _  SECALs
Technology deployment  85.7  Activity wise efficiency  40.0
Activity wise efficiency  66.7  Technology deployment  33.3
Manpower  57.1  Extent of Outsourcing/ Privatization  33.3
Extent of Outsourcing/ Privatization  47.6  Manpower  28.6
31Taxpayer compliance cost/time  42.9  Tax processing time  23.8
Tax processing time  42.9  Wage cost  23.8
Wage cost  23.8  Budgetary cost of tax administration  14.3
Budgetary cost of tax administration  14.3  Tax by tax efficiency  10.0
Cost/ revenue ratio  14.3  Taxpayer compliance cost/time  9.5
Tax by tax efficiency  10.0  Overall tax collection cost  0.0
Overall tax collection cost  4.8  Cost/ revenue ratio  0.0
Note: See the notes to Table 4.3.
Table A4. Inclusion  in Diagnosis  of Environmental  Indicators  and Analysis
(43 projects  with a major administration component)
(%  of projects)
TALs, LILs,  SALs and
SILs, RILs  SECALs
Economic conditions  76.2  Economic conditions  95.2
Taxpayer compliance  52.4  Taxpayer compliance  61.9
Tax policy constraints  38.1  Tax policy constraints  47.6
Legal system  33.3  Legal system  47.6
Civil service and general government  23.8  Financial sector and banks  47.6
Financial sector and banks  23.8  Civil service and general government  33.3
Other  18.2  Law and order  33.3
Extent of market penetration  17.6  Other  28.6
Law and order  10.0  Extent of market penetration  15.8
Note: See the notes to Table 4.3.
Table  A5. Inclusion  in Diagnosis  of Institutional  and Capacity  Indicators  and Analysis
(43 projects with a major administration component)
(% of projects)
TALs, LILs,  SALs and
l_______________________________  lSILs,  RILs  __SECALs
Basic organization  77.3  Taxpayer Obligations, Laws and Procedures  61.9
Computerization extent  72.7  Organizational structure  57.1
Organizational structure  68.2  Recent reform history  47.6
Recent reform history  59.1  Basic organization  38.1
Manpower quality  59.1  Computerization extent  38.1
Taxpayer Obligations, Laws and  57.1  Organizational autonomy  33.3
Procedures
Policy making/analysis and legal analysis  54.5  Policy making/analysis and legal analysis  33.3
capacity  capacity
Training facilities  50.0  Budget size  19.0
Quality and quantity of data disseminated  40.9  Manpower quality  19.0
Organizational autonomy  33.3  External/Internal  audit quality  19.0
Budget size  14.3  Quality and quantity of data disseminated  19.0
External/Internal audit quality  9.1  Other  19.0
Other external monitoring  9.1  Budget determination  procedures  9.5
Other  4.5  Training facilities  9.5
Budget determination  procedures  0.0  Other external monitoring  9.5
Note: See the notes to Table 4.3.
32Table A6. Percentage of Projects with Various Tax Structure Reform Components
43 projects  with  a major  administration  component
(% of relevant  projects)
TALs,  LILs,  RILs,  SILs  SALs  and SECALs
Sales/VAT  57.1  Income  85.7
Income  42.9  Corporation  85.7
Corporation  38.5  Sales/VAT  85.7
Import  tariffs  23.1  Import  tariffs  81.0
Other  national  23.1  Export  tariffs  52.6
Social  Security  16.7  Excise  52.4
Presumptive  tax - business  14.3  Other  national  36.8
Turnover  11.1  Presumptive  tax - individual  19.0
Other  Subnational  9.1  Presumptive  tax - business  19.0
Export  tariffs  8.3  Other  Subnational  16.7
Excise  7.7  Tumover  14.3
Property  7.7  Property  14.3
Presumptive  tax - individual  7.1  Social  Security  14.3
(b) Tax Policy Institutions
50.0  40.0
Notes: 1. The  table  only  shows  that the component  is present  in  the project  - it does  not indicate  whether  the
component  itself  is comprehensive.
2. Projects  where  the component  is not relevant  are excluded  from the denominator  in calculating  percentages.
Table A7. Percentage of Projects with Tax Administration Environmental Components
43 projects  with  a major  administration  component
(% of relevant  projects)
TALs,  LILs,  RILs,  SILs  SALs  and SECALs
Legal  system  50.0  Other  environental  76.2
Financial  system  27.3  Financial  system  57.1
Other  environmental  22.7  Civil  service  52.4
Civil  service  18.2  Legal  system  42.9
Judicial  system  4.5  Judicial  system  4.8
Notes:  1.  See the notes  to Table  5.1.
2. The  four main  "Other  environmental"  components  are, in descending  order  of importance,  budget  and
treasury  management,  privatization  and  parastatal  reforn, non-tariff  trade liberalization  and  the private
sector regulatory  framework.
Table A8. Percentage of Projects with Tax Administration Functional Components
43 projects  with  a major  administration  component
(% of relevant  projects)
TALs,  LILs,  RILs,  SILs  SALs  and SECALs
Cargo  clearance  90.0  Tax assessment  90.5
Tax assessment  81.8  Audit  85.7
Audit  81.8  Tax  collection  85.7
Taxpayer  identification  72.7  Taxpayer  compliance  81.0
Tax  collection  72.7  Tax  base  valuation  61.9
33Trade facilitation  72.7  Penalties/  prosecution  57.1
Taxpayer compliance  68.2  Taxpayer identification  57.1
Tax base valuation  59.1  Tax filing  50.0
Penalties/ prosecution  54.5  Cargo clearance  44.4
Taxpayer service quality  50.0  Arrears  42.9
Taxpayer education  45.5  Trade facilitation  38.9
Tax filing  45.5  Large taxpayers  38.1
Large taxpayers  45.5  Small taxpayers  23.8
Arrears  28.6  Taxpayer service quality  19.0
Small taxpayers  18.2  Taxpayer education  9.5
Note: See the notes to Table 5.1
Table A9. Percentage of Projects with Administrative Institutional or Capacity Building
Components
43 projects with a major administration component
(% of relevant projects)
TALs, LILs, RILs, SILs  SALs and SECALs
Computerization  100.0  Organizational structure  76.2
Organizational structure  77.3  Manpower rationalization  71.4
Procedural manuals  77.3  Wages and incentives  61.9
Manpower rationalization  72.7  Computerization  52.4
Training facilities  72.7  Recruitment and evaluation  52.4
Other capital/ infrastructure  68.2  Basic Organization  47.6
Policy making! analysis and legal  50.0  Training facilities  42.9
analysis capacity  =
Manpower quality  50.0  Procedural manuals  38.1
Basic Organization  45.5  Other capital/ infrastructure  38.1
Recruitment and evaluation  40.9  Manpower quality  38.1
Quality and quantity of data  36.4  Organizational autonomy  33.3
disseminated
Wages and incentives  31.8  Policy making! analysis and legal  33.3
_____________________________________________  analysis capacity
Privatization  27.3  Extemal/Intemal audit quality  33.3
Other  22.7  Other extemal monitoring  28.6
Organizational autonomy  18.2  Privatization  23.8
External/lnternal audit quality  18.2  Budget size  19.0
Other external monitoring  13.6  Quality  and quantity of data  19.0
disseminated
Budget determination/financial  9.1  Budget determination/financial  14.3
mgmt procedures  _  mgmt procedures
Budget size  4.5  Other  9.5
Notes: 1. See the note to Table 5.1.
2. While no project has an explicit anti-corruption  component, 2 TALs (9%) and 5 SALs (23%) mention reducing
corruption as a secondary  project objective.
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